The real estate sector keeps contributing significantly to the Spanish economy. A recent news article reports the existence of inefficiencies in the nature and delivery of new properties. We investigate the technical efficiency of this sector using a non-parametric "reasonable" benchmarking frontier, acknowledging the marked influence of the sector's shadow economy. We then relate the results applying a panel data analysis to the shareholding concentration and identity of firm ownership. We find no systematic support for the effect of corporate ownership on technical efficiency.
Introduction
The twin motors of tourism and construction have been argued to be current driving contributors of the Spanish economic engine. In recent years, Spain has recorded more new houses than in France, Germany and Italy combined, with a result that 20% of all houses in Spain have been built within a decade. The increasing demand for both domestic and foreign buyers has led to speculations that this property market boom will not crash soon. This has also led to significant increases in purchasing and rental properties. The low interest rates and significant lowering of unemployment rates are some factors for the increased demand.
Research on the real estate sector has mostly focused on the demand side with little importance given to the internal processes of product supplying firms to meet this ever-increasing demand. According to a recent report (Stucklin, 2004) , a sample of 82 properties in Valencia, Madrid and Barcelona that had recently been constructed revealed that more than half of these had either being delivered late or with construction faults. Because of the dynamic nature of this sector, illegal workers mostly without appropriate skills tend to be employed.
Poor finishes and workmanship seem to be the worst complaints of clients. There is therefore the need for firms in this sector to analyse their productive processes in order to be more efficient with their outputs, as increasing the efficiency of an organisation is also a desired output when enhancing product delivery. Firms with more efficient productive processes are seen to be more associated with profitable outputs than inefficient counterparts.
The construction industry of which the real estate sector is a very important part is the most dynamic of the basic sectors in terms of job creation and activity. The contribution of the construction sector as a percentage of total gross value added in 2000 was 8.5% as opposed to 5.3% for the EU-15 average. It employs 11% of the working population but three-quarters of this are workers hired on a temporary basis. Because of the temporary nature, illegal employment (shadow economy) continues to thrive although since 2001, the law imposes heavy penalties against companies employing illegal labour. From the government side too, corruption and time wastage continue to thrive when acquiring land for new properties. There are irregular sales of properties in a bid to avoid company taxation that serves to fuel the shadow economy as well.
In terms of the labour force in Spain, even the indigenous youth still hover between a "fixed term, precarious job; the shadow economy; and, now increasingly, a stable job" (Chislett, 2002: 39) . Spain can boast of the third largest shadow economy after Greece and Italy fuelled on by the increased tax and social security contributions putting its size at about 22.5% of GDP. In the real estate sector, house prices increased in 2001 because of the flushing of "black" money due to the single EU currency switch pushing it up to 11.4% in real terms. Between 1980 and 2001, the real price increase was 124% compared to a 19% global index. 86% of Spanish households own a house as compared to 61% of the EU average (Chislett, 2002) .
Despite the drain in this sector's shadow economy it still contributes significantly to the main economy. When a sector experiences a boom, it attracts new investors. Other existing investors would like to purchase more shares to be able to control the performance of the firm. Therefore, the ownership structure in this sector is also worth investigating. Studies on ownership structure, usually analysed in an agency theoretical framework, have usually been carried out as to the effect of insider ownership or ownership concentration on performance. Although, several studies report the positive (but sometimes non-monotonic) effect of insider ownership on performance, the literature on ownership concentration has seen conflicting results as to its effect. Very few studies have looked at the effect of ownership identity on performance.
In the Spanish real estate sector, the variables that are used to determine performance need to be examined for all the firms and those that serve as influential outliers removed before any statistical inferences can be deduced as a way of reducing the impact of the illegal employment in this sector. An outlier is an atypical observation in that its movement is out of pattern with other observations in dataset analysis. Most nonparametric models for determining productive efficiency do not distinguish between influential and non-influential outliers.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: in the next section, the theoretical background and state-of-the art in corporate ownership is discussed to examine the problems to be analysed followed by an explanation of technical efficiency achieved through data envelopment analysis, our proxy for firm performance. The data is then defined and variables selected. After getting the technical efficiency scores using the reasonable frontier approach which is explained prior to its application, we perform a panel regression analysis, present the results with discussions and conclude within the limitations of the paper.
Background Literature

Ownership Structure
Corporate ownership refers to residual claimants of a firm. The fewer owners a firm has, the more concentrated the shares. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) find large shareholders to increase firm performance. Ownership concentration is the share of the largest owner (Pedersen and Thomsen, 1999) . Contrary to the classical publication by Berle and Means (1932) about dispersed ownership in the public corporation, empirical findings over the past twenty years point to the issue of concentrated ownership (see for example Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Holderness and Sheehan, 1988; Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1988 ; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 1999).
The theoretical argument by Demsetz (1983) that ownership concentration was endogenous to the owner's risk propensity and the benefits obtained from monitoring managers has sparked an interesting debate. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) having controlled for some variables did not find a significant relationship between ownership and accounting profitability. Still treating ownership as an endogenous variable but multi-dimensional, Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) found no statistically significant relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance. Thereby in their view, whether the ownership is dispersed or concentrated does not matter. This result was also reported in Pedersen and Thomsen's (1999) multi-national European survey testing a model initially developed using U.S. data. Cho (1998) applies ordinary least squares (OLS) regression where ownership structure affects investment and consequently corporate value. But, in applying simultaneous regression, the endogenous nature of ownership comes into play. Corporate value is seen to affect ownership structure while ownership structure has no effect on corporate value, in support of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) . Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) however argue that Demsetz and Lehn's (1985) inability to find a significant relationship between ownership concentration and performance may be due to their use of a linear specification, which failed to capture any non-linear relationship. Leech and Leahy (1991) however report significant results using a linear specification of ownership concentration. In other studies, Gorriz and Fumas (1996 & , and Lee (2004) look at the effect of family ownership and management on firm performance. Short, Keasey and Duxbury (2002) argue that large external shareholders have incentives to monitor and curb the self-serving behaviour of managers because of their economic interests. These monitoring and curbing costs all generate costs of agency. The nature of agency cost-reducing mechanisms in terms of being complementary or substitutable as regards to shareholder/managerial equity and debt is still a subject of academic debate. Dispersed ownership is still of significance for very obvious financial reasons. Firms with funds acquired through dispersed ownership can assume larger scale operations, even diversify and thus make use of scale and scope economies. Lauterbach and Vaninsky (1999: 189) suggest it "facilitates complexoperations allowing the most skilled or expert managers to control the business […..] even when they do not have enough funds to own the firm." This leads diversified ownership firms to compensate for agency costs with improved efficiency and profitability. These developments discussed above have led to inconclusive results that either support or do not support the ownership concentrationeconomic performance relationship. Perdersen and Thomsen (1999) and Gedajlovic and Shapiro (1998) have attributed this development to "system effects". Stock market data however continue to lend support to the positive association between ownership concentration and performance (Leech & Leahy, 1991; Zeckhauser & Pound, 1990; McConnell & Servaes, 1990 Smith, 1996; Short, Keasey & Duxbury, 2002) . Highly concentrated ownership can however generate operational inefficiencies when these owners are interested in short term gains rather than long term profit maximisation. This is because they may encourage managers to engage in risky short-term strategies not aimed at cost maximisation (Kohler, 1990) . Large controlling shareholders may collude with managers to siphon resources from small shareholders (Short, 1994) . The exercise of control to expropriate firm value, at the detriment of minority shareholders, has been referred to as the expropriation hypothesis (Lange and Sharpe, 1995) .
Ownership Identity
A controlling shareholder or ultimate owner is regarded as having more than 20% direct and indirect voting rights (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 1999) . Applying this cut-off point to their empirical survey on medium-sized publicly traded firms in Spain, only family, State, and widelyheld institutions /corporations are ultimate owners in Spain. Widely-held financial and miscellaneous ultimate owners are under 1%. 1 Cross-shareholdings and pyramids are not frequent in their study, a viewpoint supported by Gorriz and Fumas (2005) . While empirical studies lend support to the managerial hypothesis that owner controlled firm have higher profitability than manager controlled firms, these results have often been highly statistically insignificant (Short, 1994) . Her surveys (1994: 208-215) covers studies where in some cases manager controlled firms outperform owner controlled firms. With this as a factor, controlling for insider ownership is not expected to have any effects on ownership identity/ concentration and performance (Cho, 1998) . Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) argue that the identity of the owners has objective performance implications through how they exercise their franchises. The categories of ownership identity are discussed below:
Institutional Ownership
With institutional ownership (for example insurance companies and pension funds), firms tend to have a long-term planning horizon, adequate financial outlays and a low aversion towards risk (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000) . They also tend not to interfere too much with the daily management of the firm as characterised by their arms-length relationship (Sarkar and Sarkar, 2000) . They pursue firms that share similar goals and objectives (Li and Simerly, 1998) . Mostly however, they have minority shares in companies that do not encourage them to monitor managerial discretion. But for a given shareholding value, Servaes (1990, 1995) and Smith (1996) have argued that they tend to have a performance impact.
The empirical results from studies on the effect of institutional ownership on firm performance are very mixed. Goergen 
Family/personal ownership
Family ownership has similar characteristics to owner-managed firms in that they tend to have a disproportionate share of their wealth invested in the company. They tend to be risk-averse and suffer from capital rationing. Nickel, Nikolitsas and Dryden (1997) find no relationship of family ownership on productivity. This category is however argued to have the best positive influence on firm performance from the agency theoretical framework.
Bank ownership
Several studies group banks with institutional ownership. In Spain, banks especially savings banks play a key role in firm ownership. It is worthy to note that saving banks have no shareholders to restrict their interest in becoming shareholders in other firms. When banks are part owners of a firm, they can internalise financial relationships. These firms are therefore less likely to be credit rationed by their banks (Ramirez, 1995) and hence bank-owned firms have the necessary capital to improve productivity (Cable, 1985) .
Corporate/ industrial company ownership
Corporate ownership is when other firms are also shareholders in other firms. Specific assets (Williamson, 1985) lead to related firms acquiring shares in a company so as to be able to monitor managerial discretion. Kester (1992) however argues that there could be a significant loss of flexibility as well as the risk of inadequate mutual monitoring. Aside from financial capital outlays, this ownership form also facilitates knowledge transfer (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000) .
Government ownership
Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) suggest they are more interested in welfare economics like low prices for outputs, higher employment goals and other objectives that drain profitability. In terms of financial profitability, government-owned firms are argued to be the worst performers. Government ownership however leads to increased financial capital "in terms of credit, liquidity, or costs of capital" (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000 :694) .
In another study, Thomsen and Pedersen (1996: 153; : 388-390) identify six classes of ownership based on the identity and share of the largest owner and the type of ownership contract. Table 1 shows the different classifications according to these researchers. This classification has also been used by Leech and Leahy (1991) . La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, (1999: 476) also classify ownership by voting rights with firms that are widely held or have ultimate owners. They have come up with five types of ultimate owners which are: a family or an individual, the State, a widely held financial institution such as a bank or an insurance company, a widely held corporation, and miscellaneous which include cooperatives, voting trust or a group with no single controlling investor.
Studies on Ownership in Spain
Martínez and Giné's (2005) empirical study of shareholders in Spain show that 80% of firms have the largest shareholder usually commanding 69% of the shares, while the second largest commands 12%. Therefore only the largest two shareholders have reasonable control of the firm. Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) have however argued the importance of the first five largest shareholders in their U.S. study. This is thus applicable in a different institutional regime.
Martínez and Giné (2005) also find a significant number of the largest shareholders being families and individuals. For financial institutions as shareholders, they report only 2% in their sample and 5% as second largest shareholders. They however admit that 42% of the firms in their sample are small firms. What they conclude is that financial institutions are keen on having controlling shares in their target firms as in 70% of the cases; where the first 10 largest shareholders are considered, they are either the largest or second largest.
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999) in their global empirical study also find that, in Spanish firms, the probability of control by a single shareholder in a family firm, State, and widely-held financial firms are all 1.0 while widely-held corporation is 0.5. Górriz and Fumas (2005) using listed Spanish firms discuss the highly concentrated ownership even among very large listed firms (see also Crespi & Garcia-Gestona, 2001 ; Górriz & Fumas, 1996) . They highlight the importance of the institutional environment in shaping ownership and performance. Table 2 is a sample of some studies in ownership.
Inference from Literature Review
Based on the literature on corporate ownership as discussed above, two key issues that need to be investigated further are the concentration and identity of ownership. Studies on ownership concentration employing stock market and profitability measures as performance proxies have been seen to have a positive impact on performance.
Other studies have shown a negative or no relationship but most of the studies have revealed this positive (but sometimes non-monotonic) relationship.
We expect to follow that trend; the more concentrated the ownership, the better the firm's performance.
Following an agency theoretical perspective and extending it to the relationship that exists between the identity of the owner(s) and the external manager, family and individual firm owners usually with a lot of personal financial commitment would find better ways of aligning their interests to that of managers and by so doing seek to increase the performance of their ventures.
We thus expect individual/family-owned to have the most positive influence on performance followed by firms owned by industrial companies, while Stateowned firms will be the worst performers.
Performance and Control Variables
For our proxy of performance, we adopt technical efficiency computed through data envelopment analysis (DEA).
The concept of DEA is explained after reviewing the usual proxies used to measure performance on ownership studies. A shortcoming of most of the papers on ownership and performance is the use of financial performance mostly stock valuation data. Lee (2004) argues that they are indirect measures of firm productivity. Short (1994) argues that ownership concentration does not necessarily lead to control and that debt holders play an important role. Hence it is necessary to control for a firm's financial structure.
Most studies control for firm financial risk with gearing ratios. The most commonly used is the debtto-equity ratio. Gearing is a measure of financial leverage, demonstrating the degree to which a firm's activities are funded by owner's funds versus creditor's funds. Firm leverage and liquidity are used to control for firm's financial structure.
Leverage is measured as the ratio of the aggregate of short-term and long-term debt to net worth. Liquidity is defined as the ratio of working capital to total assets.
Anderson and Reeb (2003) use the ratio of longterm debt to total assets as leverage. Dimelis and Louri (2002) controls for financial structure with leverage and liquidity while equating performance as return on assets (ROA) divided by total assets.
Data Envelopment Analysis
DEA compares decision-making units (DMUs) that use the same inputs to generate outputs to get the relative (technical) efficiency measures of individual DMUs.
Technical efficiency is when a firm uses minimum input(s) to have maximum output(s). DEA uses a mathematical programme to estimate the efficiency frontier. It does not need a prespecification of the production function coefficients. DEA models thus construct a non-parametric frontier over data points so that observations may lie below the frontiers ( Unlike parametric approaches, DEA makes no assumption of the distribution of the underlying data, and all deviations are assumed to be due to inefficiency (Banker et al., 1989) .
For our analysis, we adopt an input-oriented radial measure where A = {(x, y)| x can produce y} under free disposability, convexity and variable returns to scale technology.
The relationship between agency theory and DEA
Some authors such as Bogetoft (1994 Bogetoft ( , 1995 and Agrell, Bogetoft and Tind (2002) have modelled a relationship between DEA and agency theory by assuming that the best production function of a firm is not certain a priori, although the production possibility set is known.
DEA is therefore a useful tool of solving this problem based on firms that use a similar production function to minimise the extent of uncertainties.
Data Analysis Data Selection, DEA Input and Output Specifications
The sample we employ in the analysis is selected from the SABI database which is managed by Bureau Van Dijk. The Activity NACE Rev. The variables selected from unconsolidated accounts (in thousands of Euros) are; fixed assets, material costs, employee costs and other costs as inputs, and operating turnover as an output. These are shown in table 3. Due to the effect of the shadow economy on accounting data, we use cost of employees rather than number of employees as an output variable. One reason for this is because most of the employment in this sector is temporary making the number of employees unsuitable. The effect of the shadow economy is also reflected in some extremely low employee costs for some firms. These firms together with those with very low material costs and operating turnovers have been omitted from the sample even before running frontier analyses since they serve to be potential outliers. This serves to limit the effect of the shadow economy on data input as well as sub-normal firm conditions.
DEA Results and the Use of a Reasonable Frontier
Outlier detection with technical efficiency scores has been investigated (see Wilson, 1995 1993) super-efficiency tests for the period to rank efficient units and detect outliers. These outliers may be either influential or non-influential. To determine which outliers are non-influential so that we keep them in the sample, we perform a systematic superefficiency test beginning with the outlier with the biggest score. In this case, we omit that DMU and perform another Andersen-Petersen super-efficiency test. We iteratively repeat the procedure for all outliers. We then run Wilcoxon's matched pairs signed-ranked tests on the results with and without the reference outliers. This is because we do not make assumptions on the efficiency distribution. The Wilcoxon test z checks for the same median in two probability distributions as shown below. where n is the number of DMUs under investigation, K + is the lower of two values given as the sum of positive ranks or sum of negative ranks If the differences in means are significantly different , we remove those outliers. We keep the outliers that have statistically insignificant differences in means. As can be seen in table 4, three more outliers are influential in 1998 while four are influential in 2000 and 2002 (when compared to that achieved using the procedure proposed by Wilson, 1995) . We then perform a normal technical efficiency test in VRS technology to achieve our reasonable contemporaneous frontiers. The concept of a reasonable frontier has already been applied by Prior and Surroca (2004) where the theoretical explanation and its comparison to Wilson's (1995) procedure has been given in detail.
In applying this reasonable frontier, we solve for two problems usually encountered with DEA models; the presence of a firm whose performance cannot be matched and a firm whose presence masks the performance of others.
Variables and Measures
The pure technical efficiency values, European ratios, and ownership for 1998, 2000 and 2002 are applied in the analysis. These are:
• Pure technical efficiency measure -VRS (performance measure) • Liquidity ratio -Liquidity (controls for financial structure) • Gearing ratio -Gearing (controls for financial structure) • Independence indicator (A, B, C and U) -Ownership concentration • Identity of ultimate firm ownerOwnership identity • Date of establishment of the firm -Age (controls for firm size) • Natural logarithm of total assets -Control for firm size We are unable to control for insider ownership due to the use of a database that does not include this. In any case, Cho (1998) found no significant impact of insider ownership on ownership structure and performance relationship. Tables 5 and 6 describe statistics of the quantitative and qualitative variables used. The pure technical efficiency score is used as a proxy for performance. We use gearing ratio (debtto-equity ratio and indicating a firm's leverage) and liquidity ratio (liquidity) to control for a firm's financial structure. Firm age and the natural logarithm of total assets are used to control for firm size. The variables that are related to ownership structure is the independence indicator. The ownership identity is measured by shareholder type. With this, we have as an ultimate owner: individual or family shareholders, an industrial company or a State or public organisation. For banks, a financial companies (investment companies, insurance companies, mutual and pension funds, trusts, and trustees), foundations or research institutions, the database has very few of these types necessitating their omission from the analysis as already observed in other studies in Spain. About half of the firms in the sample do not provide information on the identity of the ultimate owner. As regards to independence indicator, we use the measure applied by Bureau Van Dijk where A + , A and A -are denoted by A and imply no shareholder has more than 24.9% direct or total ownership. B + , B and B -are denoted by B and imply a shareholder has more than 24.9% but not more than 49.9% direct or total ownership. C implies a shareholder has more than 49.9% direct or total ownership. U is the situation where there is an unknown degree of independence.
Ownership Analysis and Results
Because DEA provides comparison to extreme as opposed to average observations, there is no assumption of normal distribution necessitating the use of regression techniques that are not based on this assumption. It is also very important to remove influential outliers from the sample since these observations serve as wrong yardsticks.
A Tobit regression analysis (for panel dataset) is used with technical efficiency (VRS) scores obtained through the reasonable frontier approach as a dependent variable to test the effect of ownership concentration and identity on performance.
We perform the regression in stages, by introducing each of the independent variables with the control variables and checking for the magnitude and sign of coefficients. We then perform a multivariate regression with both independent and control variables. The regression results are presented in table 7. 
Ownership Identity
To test for the effect of ownership identity on performance, we create dummies for individual/family firm owners, firms with ultimate owners as industrial companies and State-owned firms. The agency view argues that individual/family firm owners should perform better than those owned by industrial companies while State-owned companies will be the least performers. Controlling for firm financial structure and size, the regression model M2 (table 7 above) gives negative values for the variables used apart from liquidity which has a positive sign. Total assets, liquidity and a firm's gearing as expected are all significant with coefficient magnitudes of 0.0245, 0.0093 and 0.0002 respectively. Only individual/family owned firms systematically affects technical efficiency, although in a negative way. In the sample used however, industrial companies seem to have the least negative influence while State-run firms negatively affect technical efficiency the most.
Ownership Concentration
Similar to the analysis of ownership identity, we create dummy variables for the ownership concentration variable as seen in model M3 (table 7  above) . From the agency theoretical perspective, the more concentrated the ownership, the lesser the agency costs and hence better firm's performance. To this extent, the coefficient of C should be lower than that of B, and A should be the least. We find partial support for this as the coefficient of C is positive and significant. A is negative and significant while B is negative and not significant. The effect of the control variables are the same as in ownership identity.
Corporate Structure
In model M1 (table 7 above), we run a multivariate regression with both independent variables with the control variables for financial structure and size. All the coefficients in this case are negative. Of the two independent variables, only individual/family owned firms have a systematic negative effect. Industrial firms have a better effect on technical efficiency than individuals though the effect is not systematic. Staterun firms have the least influence albeit, unsystematically. Looking at the statistically insignificant coefficients of ownership concentration, C has the best influence on technical efficiency, followed by B and A as hypothesised.
Discussion
The technical efficiency results in table 5 indicate an average of 69% technical efficiency over the period but under contemporaneous frontier considerations. Reductions in these inefficiencies can lead to significant improvements in outputs reflecting in improved profitability since technical efficiency is argued to be positively associated with performance. The reasonable frontier helps identify firms whose productive efficiency can distort the frontier with which other firms can be compared to. Detecting and removing these outliers that do not fit in the pattern (or are atypical) of the remaining observations make DEA efficiency scores more reliable.
In the 1998 contemporaneous reasonable frontier, the average technical efficiency of the firms was highest at 84%, declining to 61% in 2000 and a marginal increase in 2002 at 62% (and increasing just below 80% in 2003, although results for this year is not reported in this paper). During this period where firms experienced reductions in technical efficiency, profitability also increased due to an increasing demand for new properties, due in part to the freeing of "black" money because of a monetary currency switch. The real estate market was booming in this period so as long as firms became increasingly profitable due to demand factors, productive efficiency was not taken seriously. Firms in the real estate sector can become more profitable by becoming more technically efficient by up to a potential average of 31%.
The effect of ownership structure on performance as regards to ownership concentration measured by the independence indicator has not been fully supported and thus cannot be statistically generalised. Kohler (1990) , Lange and Sharpe (1995) and Short (1994) have all given their perspectives as to why concentrated ownership might fail to give the expected results. The Tobit regression model yields both significant and insignificant differences (as observed also by Prowse, 1992 and Zoido, 1998) contributing to the debate on the mixed effect of ownership structure on performance.
As already pointed out earlier in the literature review, most studies that have had a positive association between ownership concentration and performance relate to stock market data (Leech & Leahy, 1991; Zeckhauser & Pound, 1990; McConnell & Servaes, 1995; Smith, 1996) . Lauterbach and Vaninsky (1999) in their use of both profitability and DEA proxies of firm performance gave similar results in ownership evaluations.
The hypothesis on the effect of ownership identity is not supported. Although not statistically significant, the regression models M1 and M2 put firms with industrial companies as ultimate owners to have better technical efficiency than individual/family owned firms. The State-owned firms are seen as the worst performers.
This statistically insignificant result is not too surprising, given the mixed outcomes of studies on this subject. The effect of individual/family owned firms and those owned by industrial companies is worth investigating though as some non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis tests (not reported here) yielded similar results of the latter being more technically efficient, but then of course this study is only limited to the real estate industry in Spain and a significant number of firms do not report their ownership identity in the database employed.
Conclusion
The reasonable frontier approach has been useful in ameliorating two of the problems usually encountered with DEA models; the presence of firms whose performance cannot be matched and firms whose presence mask the performance of others. In this case, only firms in the real estate sector whose patterns follow a general trend are used in computing the frontier and thus a useful benchmark for inefficient firms.
The general observation has been that firms in the real estate sector are only 69% efficient in their productive efficiency. However, there has been a downward trend in technical efficiency recorded from 1998 to 2002 attributable to the increasing demand for new property. State-owned firms have been observed to be the most inefficient while companies with industrial companies as ultimate shareholders tend to be more productively efficient than individuals/families-owned firms although only at the sample level. It goes to buttress the now increasing literature on the endogenous nature of ownership structure and the consideration of more sophisticated techniques and more managerial variables to achieve practical outcomes.
The ownership concentration is seen to affect the technical efficiency when this is considered alone but in the presence of ownership identity too, this assertion becomes statistically insignificant necessitating the concomitant analysis of these and other variables rather than carrying out individual research.
As a final remark, of implication to policy is the 31% technical inefficiency that exists in the real estate sector. The reports of poor workmanship and finishes as well as delays in delivery of finished products can be traced in part to these inefficiencies and the demand for new property. As a major driver in the Spanish economic progress in recent times, firms in this sector when made aware of the levels of technical inefficiencies (and recommendations given for practice) will give shareholders the right value for their investments.
Limitations
We do not distinguish between individual and family owned firms that have an insider or outsider manager because of data limitations. We also assume from the agency theoretical framework that a single owner is able to align his interests with the manager more than several owners because of the increased costs due to opportunism. Then also, the use of a panel censored regression limits the use of more sophisticated models that have been applied in examining the ownership-performance relationship. The use of a database also denies the use of some managerial variables that could be used in the DEA specifications or as control variables in the regression analysis to adequately control for ownership structure, and the effects of the shadow economy. We have only used contemporaneous frontiers and thus can only comment on average efficiencies for single time periods. The use of intertemporal frontiers can show the relative changes in efficiency across time periods.
Directions for future research
We presented a table based on some corporate ownership studies that showed many different analytical tools, techniques and variables used to moderate the relationship between ownership structure and performance. Applying these to the same sample can be a useful indication of which one explains the variability of performance best. In the field of DEA, recent studies have employed techniques for statistically generalising technical efficiency results as for example through bootstrapping as proposed by Simar and Wilson (2000) . Its use can help in giving some global credibility to technical efficiency levels by estimating the sample variation of efficiency estimators. The idea of a reasonable benchmarking frontier also needs to be simplified computationally to handle very large datasets. 15 years of data on 53 of both Spanish publicly listed family-and nonfamily-owned firms Parametric estimation of productivity. Dependent variables: TFP (ratio of assets to employees), Growth/size constraint (asset, age and average growth -ROA and invested capital), Profitability -ROA (controlling for debt structure), Tobin's Qratio. Predictor variable: Listed family and non-family-owned firms. Control variables: Long-term debt to total debt ratio, debt to assets ratio. 
